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Expanding the Regulation of Online  
Speech through the Commerce Clause  
to Reduce Cyber Harassment 
by KATHERINE PARKER* 
Introduction 
It is a familiar trope that if you gather a group of women in one room, 
each one will have a personal story about abuse or harassment.1  This Note 
focuses on one potential solution for harassment many women face online: 
federal regulation of cyber-threats and cyber harassment.  This Note argues 
that speech used online to harass and intimidate women may be regulated 
because the speech is not protected under the First Amendment and because 
the mode of communication—the Internet—is a regulatable instrumentality 
of commerce.2  Thus, online harassment can be regulated through the 
Commerce Clause.3  Part I of this Note demonstrates the extent of the 
harassment many women face by merely engaging with, and operating 
businesses, on the Internet.  Part II analyzes whether such speech is protected 
by the First Amendment and whether the Internet is an instrumentality of 
commerce, capable of being regulated at all.  Part III proposes methods the 
government could use to protect women online, through broader regulation.  
Essentially, this Note argues that the federal government can regulate cyber-
threats and cyber-harassment under the Commerce Clause.  Ultimately, this 
note suggests that such regulation will allow the Internet to become a space 
 
        *   University of California, Hastings College of the Law J.D. Candidate 2020.  I am grateful 
to the CLQ editors for their support and helpful suggestions.   
 1.  NPR recently found that 41% of women have been sexually harassed online.  Rhitu 
Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual Harassment, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-per 
cent-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment. (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).  Similarly, the 
Women’s Media Center estimated in 2014 that between 20% and 40% of all Internet users had 
experienced harassment online.  Women’s Media Center, https://www.womensmediacenter.com/ 
speech-project/research-statistics (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).  
 2.  Discussed infra, Part II.   
 3.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.   
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where men and women are equally welcome and equally able to participate.  
Throughout this Note, the terms “harassment”4 and “threats”5 will be used to 
describe some of the messages directed towards women online.  While these 
terms may be considered overbroad, they are accurate descriptors of the 
language many women encounter on a regular basis.  Creating regulations to 
diminish online threats and harassment is vital because this language has a 
real and detrimental effect on women offline.6 
I. The Problem: The Language  
Women Encounter Online 
Women in America have historically experienced less protection of the 
law than men.  As historian and author Joan Hoff7 remarked in her book LAW 
GENDER AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN, “the U.S. 
Constitution still does not explicitly protect women against discrimination.”  
The result that women have less ability to operate in public spaces because 
“fear has become a constant factor in the intellectual and physical lives of 
contemporary women.”8  Hoff’s book provides a historical analysis of the 
legal status of women in America and was published in 1991, but the issues 
she identified are as present on the Internet today, as they were off-line more 
than twenty years ago.9  In 2014, Simon Parkin, a journalist writing for The 
New Yorker, described the culture of intimidation that many women face 
online in order to earn a living.10  In an article titled “Zoe Quinn’s Depression 
Quest,” Parkin described Zoe Quinn and her experience releasing a video 
 
 4.  The definition of harassment varies state by state but is “generally defined as a course of 
conduct which annoys, threatens, intimidates, alarms” another person or puts another “in fear of 
their safety.”  U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/h/harassment/ (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019).  
 5.  A threat is a “communicated intent to inflict or impose harm or damage or loss or injury 
on another . . . [or to] diminish a person’s freedom to act voluntarily.”  U.S. LEGAL, https://definit 
ions.uslegal.com/t/threat-of-use-force/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).  
 6.  The importance and impact of words on people has been described frequently.  See, e.g., 
“Words are . . . our most inexhaustible source of magic, capable of both inflicting injury and 
remedying it.”  HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS: PART TWO (Warner Bros. 2011). 
 7.  Joan Hoff is the author of numerous texts that discuss American politics and political 
history.  She is currently a research professor at Montana State University and she has delivered 
many lectures which focus on women’s rights.  
 8.  JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 3, 5 
(1991).  
 9.  In LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN, Hoff argues that 
women (and other minority groups) were only granted rights by law to act as their white male 
counterparts did when those in power no longer needed to have exclusive control over that 
privilege.  Id. at 7.  While this argument has historical merit, it is my hope that the trend can be 
reversed as we increasingly rely on the Internet for more than individual-to-individual interactions.  
 10.  Simon Parkin, Zoe Quinn’s Depression Quest, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 7, 2019), https:// 
www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/zoe-quinns-depression-quest. 
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game online earlier that year.11  Quinn is an online game creator who 
developed a game that would mimic a day in the life of a person suffering 
from depression.  Quinn’s hope was that by playing the game, gamers would 
develop greater empathy for people struggling with mental illnesses.12  
Quinn also hoped that the game would create a safe space for those who 
struggle with mental illness to feel welcomed and accepted.13  However, 
Quinn’s game was not well-received, as many users felt that its atypical plot 
arc did not conform to standard video game characteristics, and thus failed 
to meet their expectations.14  Users responded by threatening Quinn 
personally.  On the web forum 4chan,15 an anonymous discussion board, one 
gamer suggested, 
Next time [Quinn] shows up at a conference we . . . give her a 
crippling injury that’s never going to fully heal . . . a good solid 
injury to the knees.  I’d say a brain damage, but we don’t want to 
make it so she ends up too retarded to fear us.16 
Quinn ignored these and similar threats until her personal information 
was released online.17  This leak of Quinn’s personal information allowed 
4chan users to target Quinn more easily.  The release of her private 
information led to a multitude of “prank calls, threatening e-mails, and 
abusive tweets [which] intensified to such a degree that Quinn, fearing 
for her safety, chose to leave her home and sleep on friends’ sofas.”18  
Part of what frightened Quinn so much was that she was personally 
targeted and that the threats and criticism were not directed at the quality 
of her game, but towards her personally.19 
Zoe Quinn is not the only woman receiving targeted threats and 
harassment online.  In an article in the Pacific Standard, Amanda Hess 
 
 11.  Parkin, supra note 10. 
 12.  Id. (Quinn’s game, Depression Quest, forces the player to make mundane decisions that 
the protagonist struggles to complete because of “depression’s fug.”) 
 13.  Id. (Quinn decided to release this game as a “way to create an experience that built 
understanding between” those with mental illness and those without.  Quinn’s cocreator explained 
that they wanted to “communicate what it is like” to struggle with mental illness, rather than attempt 
to show it using “oblique . . . metaphor and symbolism”.) 
 14.  Id. (Players complained that the game does not have “typical attributes of video games” 
like “spatial reasoning puzzles . . . tests of reaction speed” or even “a victorious ending”.  Other 
players said that the game is either too simple or too complex.) 
 15.  4chan is a website where users anonymously publish posts under various message boards.  
The website is open to all, and has been linked to the alt-right.  Users have threatened violence in 
order to elicit reactions from the public.  http://www.4chan.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
 16.  Parkin, supra note 10.  
 17.  Id.   
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Parkin writes, “In Quinn’s case, the fact that she was the subject of the attacks rather than 
the friend who wrote about her game reveals the true nature of much of the criticism: a pretense to 
make further harassment of women in the industry permissible.”  Id. 
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described her experiences with online harassment.20  Hess, a female 
journalist with a robust Internet presence, comments early in her article that 
she regularly receives personal threats and has come to see them as 
ordinary.21  She describes being so accustomed to comments about her 
appearance that, after posting an article about her personal life, she found the 
comments she received about her looks and personal life were not “out of 
the ordinary.”22  However, Hess realized that readers had posted other, more 
concerning comments in addition to the usual comments about her 
appearance.23  Hess noted a distinction between those tweets and 
comments that merely generalized statements about readers’ perceptions 
of their appearance and those that were clear threats.24  For example, one 
Twitter user wrote, 
I am 36 years old, I did 12 years for ‘manslaughter’, I killed a 
woman, like you, who decided to make fun of guys cocks . . . . 
Happy to say we live in the same state. Im looking you up, and when 
I find you, im going to rape you and remove your head . . . . You are 
going to die and I am the one who is going to kill you.  I promise 
you this.25 
Hess contacted a local police department, but they indicated they were 
treating her concern for her own safety as an overreaction to an Internet ruse.26 
While Hess faces a particularly extreme volume of threatening 
messages online because she uses Twitter to communicate socially and 
professionally,27 overall, women are exposed to more online criminal 
behavior than men.  In a 2014 Time Magazine article, media critic Soraya 
Chemaly noted that: 
Department [of Justice] records reveal that 70 percent of those 
stalked online are women.  More than 80 percent of cyber-stalking 
defendants are male.  Similarly, a study of 1,606 revenge porn 
cases showed that 90 percent of those whose photos were shared 
were women, targeted by men.  In gaming, an industry known for 
endemic sexism, studies cited by Citron show that 70 percent of 
women in multiplayer games play as male characters in order to 
avoid abuse.28 
 
 20.  Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PACIFIC STANDARD (Jan. 6, 
2014), https://psmag.com/social-justice/women-arent-welcome-Internet-72170.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id.   
 25.  Hess, supra note 20. 
 26.  Id.   
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Soraya Chemaly, There’s No Comparing Male and Female Harassment Online, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 9, 2014), http://time.com/3305466/male-female-harassment-online/. 
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Chemaly’s research reveals that women are targeted online not due to their 
roles as authors, commenters, or creators, but due to their identity as women.  
Though women do not use the Internet more than men do, they are more 
prone to cyber-threats and harassment online.  In 2005, the Pew Research 
Center reported that while women and men use the Internet in equal 
proportions, of the thousands of reports of cyber-harassment and stalking 
72.5 percent of reporters were female.29  More recent data suggest that, in 
“theory, these things can happen to anyone—but they don’t.  They happen 
overwhelming[ly] to women and the abusers are overwhelmingly men.”30 
Moreover, men are reportedly using the Internet in order to intimidate 
and frighten women in cyberspace when in-person harassment is not 
possible.31  In a 2012 survey, the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence found that “89 percent of local domestic violence programs 
reported that victims were experiencing intimidation and threats by abusers 
via technology, including through cell phones, texts, and email.”32  The very 
real and troubling experience of merely existing as a woman in the twenty-
first century is that women are more likely to be threatened and harassed, 
both in person and online, than men are.33  Chemaly and Hoff both argue that 
this reality is rooted in “specific discriminatory harms”34 and social and legal 
efforts to prevent women from achieving real and meaningful control35 over 
themselves.  Chemaly adds that Internet harassment aimed at women is 
rarely taken seriously by (often male) police officers and legislators, both 
because these men interpret the messages women receive as mere 
“unpleasantries” and because they believe that these messages are 
“inconsequential” or unlikely to actually cause harm to the recipient.36  Even 
if these messages seem unimportant to third parties, the messages often incur 
severe real-world costs to the women who receive them.  Hess notes that 
“[t]hreats of rape, death, and stalking can overpower [women’s] emotional 
bandwidth, take up [women’s] time, and cost [women] money through legal 
fees, online protection services, and missed wages.”37 
 
 29.  Hess, supra note 20. 
 30.  Chemaly, supra note 28.  See also, Working to Halt Online Abuse, Online 
Harassment/Cyberstalking Statistics, http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-
2013.pdf. (last visited Jan. 30, 2020.) 
 31.  Chemaly, supra note 28. (“Online harassment is a key weapon in intensified stalking . . . . 
Intimate partners create impersonator content online, sometimes with brutal results). 
 32.  Chemaly, supra note 28. 
 33.  NPR found in 2018 that while 41% of women have faced cyber sexual harassment online, 
only 22% of men have.  NPR, supra, note 1.   
 34.  Chemaly, supra note 28. 
 35.  Hoff, supra note 7 at 10.  
 36.  Chemaly, supra note 28.  
 37.  Hess, supra note 20.  
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As of this writing, there are relatively few useful solutions available to 
women who experience online harassment.  The first is to ignore the online 
messages.  This strategy is inefficient because it places the fear and onus of 
dealing with these threats directly on women, the victims of the harassment, 
rather than on the actors themselves to change their behavior.  This solution 
also makes the Internet less diverse and less useful for all users because it 
implies that women should just stop using the Internet.38  It has been reported 
that women stop going online in order to avoid harassment, demonstrated by 
Pew Research in 2005 when “the percentage of Internet users who participate 
in online chats and discussion groups dropped from 28 percent to 17 
percent.”39  This decrease was “entirely because of women’s fall off in 
participation.”40  In 2015, the Web Foundation found that of the people who 
do not use the Internet globally, “most of [the non-users] are women and 
girls,” in part because “women don’t feel safe on the web.”41 
The second solution has been to enact legislation criminalizing this 
behavior.  Hess notes: 
There are three federal laws that apply to cyberstalking cases; the 
first was passed in 1934 to address harassment through the mail, 
via telegram, and over the telephone, six decades after Alexander 
Graham Bell’s invention.  Since the initial passage of the Violence 
Against Women Act, in 1994, amendments to the law have 
gradually updated it to apply to new technologies and to stiffen 
penalties against those who use them to abuse.  Thirty-four states 
have cyberstalking laws on the books; most have expanded long-
standing laws against stalking and criminal threats to prosecute 
crimes carried out online.42 
At best, these laws regarding the online treatment of women are extremely 
outdated, and only address cyber-stalking.43  Federal law fails to address the 
plethora of newfound ways women are harassed, harangued, and harmed 
online by others. 
Some states have also attempted to criminalize this type of speech.44  
However, because online stalkers are able to use the Internet to threaten 
 
 38.  Women’s Media Center, supra, note 1.  
 39.  Hess, supra note 20. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Web Foundation, Five Barriers, Five Solutions: Closing the Gender Gap in ICT Policy, 
(June 9, 2015) https://webfoundation.org/2015/06/five-barriers-five-solutions-closing-the-gender- 
gap-in-ict-policy/.  
 42.  Hess, supra note 20. 
 43.  42 U.S.C. 13701.  
 44.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-4.1 (LEXIS through New Jersey 218th Second Annual 
Session, L. 2019, c. 153 and J. R. 15), which defines and criminalizes cyber-harassment.  
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Texas have also criminalized cyber-bullying of minors and 
by public officials.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4503 (LEXIS through the 2019 Regular Session), 
D - PARKER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:24 AM 
Spring 2020]    EXPANDING THE REGULATION OF ONLINE SPEECH 481 
others from almost anywhere, the result is that a woman threatened in one 
state may have no recourse against a stalker or harasser who happens to live 
in another.45  This would also implicate procedural hurdles that litigation 
entails, and which this article will not discuss.  Compounding the problem, 
law enforcement officers often dismiss women’s complaints about Internet 
threats as non-immediate, boyish hoaxes rather than legitimate threats and 
crimes.46  Given that many of these threats are made across state lines and 
that so many of these threats are directed at women based on their gender, it 
is critical that Congress address this harassment rather than waiting for a 
state-by-state approach which has not been effective in preventing 
harassment. 
II. Internet Communications Can Be Regulated Without 
Infringing on Freedom of Speech Protections. 
I propose that a potential solution to the issue of threatening and 
offensive online speech directed against women is to regulate this speech via 
federal law.  Currently, the federal government has not taken a stance on 
these Internet threats, leaving content regulation and censorship in the hands 
of individual states and private companies who own various Internet 
platforms.  Some platforms have cited the Free Speech Rights of all users to 
allow commenters to post offensive and threatening content.47  The federal 
government is unable to regulate events and actions that take place within 
one state unless it has a jurisdictional hook.48  However, the federal 
government can regulate the Internet because it is an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce.49  Online speech directed at women could be 
 
18 Pa. C. S. § 2709 (LEXIS through the 2019 Regular Session Act 118), Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
388.135 (LEXIS through Chapters 1-39, 41-60, 62-69, 71-78, 80, 81, 84-86, 90-94, 96-99, 101, 
102, 104-106, 108-110, 112-127, 134-138, 142-147, 149, 151-168, 173, 179-184, 190-195, 197-
200, 202-206, 217-225, 229-231, 233, 235, 251, 253-255, 265-267, 277-281, 441-471, 522-525, 
and 576-587 of the 80th Regular Session (2019), including all legislation effective May 28, 2019 
or earlier), Tex. Penal Code § 22.11 (LEXIS through the 2019 Regular Session, 86th Legislature, 
and 2019 election results).   
 45.  Hess quips, “[t]he Internet is a global network, but when you pick up the phone to report 
an online threat, whether you are in London or Palm Springs, you end up face-to-face with a cop 
who patrols a comparatively puny jurisdiction.”  Hess, supra note 20.  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Patriot Act with Hasan Minhaj: Content Moderation and Free Speech, NETFLIX (Mar. 
12, 2019), https://www.netflix.com/watch/80990678. 
 48.  U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).  The Court found that the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act “neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that [gun] possession 
be connected in any way to interstate commerce” and therefore “exceeds the authority of 
Congress.” 
 49.  United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Internet is an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce); Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 
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penalized—perhaps even criminalized—through the federal government’s 
ability to regulate the Internet.  However, this regulation must also walk the 
fine line that Internet platforms have been struggling to toe: how to protect 
Internet users from harassment and online threats, while simultaneously 
protecting other users’ First Amendment right to free speech. 
A.  Some Online Speech Can Be Regulated 
The First Amendment states that Congress may not pass any law that 
limits the freedom of speech.50  Further, this constitutional amendment was 
made applicable to the states by incorporation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.51  Courts have often cited freedom of expression, protected by 
these amendments, to permit communications considered lewd and 
offensive.52  For example, in Cohen v. California, the Court upheld Cohen’s 
right to wear a jacket53 that offended many people around him because it 
expressed a strongly negative and incendiary opinion of the draft.54  The 
Court reversed Cohen’s conviction for “disturbing the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood or person by offensive conduct”55 after concluding that Cohen 
did not act on the message written on his jacket, did not encourage or 
provoke others to act, and that seeing the message did not harm or insult 
anyone.56  The Court further explained that preventing Cohen and others 
from expressing their opinions would be detrimental to society: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours.  It is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
 
(N.D. Ga. 2006.) (holding that Congress may regulate the Internet because it is an instrumentality 
of interstate commerce.)   
 50.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I.   
 51.  “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.  See 
also, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (extending the First Amendment to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 52.  See, e.g. Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684 
(1959) (holding that New York could not prohibit a theater from showing Lady Chatterley’s Lover 
simply because the film’s themes included adultery); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (holding 
that Indiana could not prohibit anti-war statements when the words were not intended to produce 
imminent disorder and were not likely to produce disorder).   
 53.  Cohen’s jacket read “Fuck the Draft.”  Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 54.  Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).  
 55.  Id. at 16.  
 56.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16, 20.  
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largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport 
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests.57 
While freedom of speech protections are intended, among other things, 
to promote communication between individuals, this limit on the power of 
the federal government is not absolute.58  The Court has held many times that 
“the Constitution does not protect true threats.”59  A true threat is a “serious 
expression of intent to commit unlawful physical harm.”60  This limitation 
on complete freedom of expression is required in favor of the public 
policy to protect others in society.  In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court 
reasoned that 
[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.  
The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the 
enforcement of that protection.  In every case the power to regulate 
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly 
to infringe the protected freedom.61 
The Court placed this stance on full display in Virginia v. Black, when 
Virginia argued that Black committed a felony when he led a Ku Klux Klan 
rally that culminated in a public cross burning, a violation of a state statute 
that prohibited burning a cross with the intent to intimidate.62  Black argued 
that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional because it prohibited him from 
freely expressing himself.63  The Court noted that Black could make a First 
Amendment argument because the “First Amendment affords protection to 
symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”64  However, the 
Court clarified that even if cross burning was not an imminent threat, this 
expressive conduct could be banned because “a State may punish those 
words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.’”65  If cross burnings are considered 
 
 57.  Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.  
 58.  Id. at 20.  
 59.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015). 
 60.  Id. at 2009. 
 61.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). 
 62.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349 (2003). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Black, 538 U.S. at 358. 
 65.  Black, 538 U.S. at 359.  The Court also explained that cross-burning is likely to breach 
the peace because it is used “as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence.”  Id. at 
354.  The Court further reasoned that “while cross burning sometimes carries no intimidating 
message, at other times the intimidating message is the only message convey[ed] . . . the burning 
cross often serves as a message of intimidation, designed to inspire in the victim fear of bodily 
harm.”  Id. at 358 (emphasis added). 
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offensive expressions such that a First Amendment analysis is appropriate, 
then comments and messages posted online may also be expressive conduct 
even if these comments are not speech.66  Although cross burnings and 
Internet threats could be distinguished based on the proximity of the 
message,67 both forms of expression communicate threats.  Moreover, both 
cross burnings and online threats are designed to be intimidating and are 
costly to the message’s recipient. 
The Court in Black went on to hold that even though cross burning is 
expressive conduct, not all speech or expressive conduct is protected by the 
First Amendment.68  The Court reasoned that true threats do not receive First 
Amendment protection because the purpose of these statements is to 
“communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”69  The Court 
reasoned that since “the history of cross burning in this country shows that 
cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear in 
victims that they are a target of violence,”70 this form of expression was not 
guaranteed First Amendment protection.71  
Like cross burnings, Internet threats and harassment are expressions 
that can be designed to intimidate, frighten, and silence other Internet users.  
For instance, after her game was published, Zoe Quinn’s “home address, 
phone numbers [and] bank details” were published.72  This allowed strangers 
to “harangue and harass her” with “prank calls, threatening e-mails, and 
abusive tweets”73  As such, it is likely that these communications are 
analogous to other expressive communications that are designed to 
intimidate others and are not entitled to First Amendment protections. 
Unlike the regulation in question in Black, however, regulations of 
cyber-threats and cyber-harassment need not be overbroad.  In Black, the 
Court ultimately found that while cross burning is not protected speech, the 
regulation that Virginia had enacted, which treated “any cross burning as 
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate” made the statute 
unconstitutional74  Federal regulation of cyber-threats and cyber-harassment 
 
 66.  The Supreme Court in this case ultimately struck down the Virginia law for over breadth, 
explaining that an action cannot by itself also be prima facie proof of intent.  Thus, while Virginia 
could restrict its citizens’ expression by prohibiting cross burning, it could not rely on this action 
to support finding of the actor’s intent.  Id. at 364.   
 67.  Cross burnings on one’s property are certainly more graphic and immediately dangerous 
than some online comments and messages.  
 68.  Black, 538 U.S. at 358. 
 69.  Id. at 359. 
 70.  Id. at 360. 
 71.  Id. at 363.   
 72.  Parkin, supra note 10.  
 73.  Parkin, supra, note 10.  See also Hess, supra, note 20.   
 74.  Black, 538 U.S. at 347.   
D - PARKER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2020  9:24 AM 
Spring 2020]    EXPANDING THE REGULATION OF ONLINE SPEECH 485 
would need to be drafted to make cyber-threats illegal without regard to the 
reason motivating the threat75 while also distinguishing between the 
threatening act and the actor’s intent. 
Some courts have begun to curtail First Amendment protections to 
Internet communications designed to intimidate others.  In D.C. v. R.R, the 
Fourth District of the California Appellate Court applied the idea that certain 
forms of expression may not be entitled to freedom of speech protections to 
a cyber-bullying case involving a minor plaintiff and a minor defendant.76  
There, the plaintiff argued that the defendant defamed the plaintiff in a 
publication on the defendant’s website.77  The court first acknowledged that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect freedom of speech in order to 
“allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of 
people might find distasteful or discomforting.”78  The court went on to hold, 
however, that 
[t]he First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas [which are] of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality79 [and 
that a state may] punish those words which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.80 
As in Virginia v. Black, the court identified true threats among the types of 
speech that are not protected by the First Amendment, which it defined as 
“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”81 
In D.C. v. R.R., the court outlined two possible tests to determine if a 
speaker’s words or acts should be considered a “true threat”.82  The court 
reasoned that the purpose of First Amendment speech protection is to 
encourage and facilitate open dialogue.83  However, once a speaker has 
 
 75.  See R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (a city regulation prohibiting cross 
burning was struck down because the ordinance only prohibited burning symbols that could “arouse 
anger . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”). 
 76.  D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1210 (2010). 
 77.  Id. at 1200. 
 78.  Id. at 1211.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1211.  
 81.  Id. at 1213. 
 82.  D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1211.  
 83.  “The notion that some expression may be regulated consistent with the first 
amendment . . .  starts with the already familiar proposition that expression has special value only 
in the context of dialogue: communication in which the participants seek to persuade, or are 
persuaded; communication which is about changing or maintaining beliefs, or taking or refusing to 
take action on the basis of one’s beliefs . . . .  It is not plausible to uphold the right to use words as 
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begun to threaten others, then the right to protection shifts.  When this 
happens, the person being threatened is deserving of protection against 
threats.84  This includes protection from “fear of violence [and] from the 
disruption that fear engenders.”85  The court then determined that the First 
Amendment protections afforded to a threat are based on whether the threat 
is a true threat under an objective standard or a subjective standard.86  
Different jurisdictions have adopted each test, and the Supreme Court seems 
to have adopted a hybrid approach. 
i. The Objective Test for True Threats 
Under an objective test, the question is “whether a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the 
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm 
or assault.”87  Under this test, the intent of the speaker is less important than 
a reasonable interpretation of the message or communication, and is 
determined “in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding 
events and reaction of the listeners.”88  Under this test, any statement made 
online that a reasonable person would interpret as a serious expression of 
intent to harm another person, like the threats that Zoe Quinn89 and Amanda 
Hess90 received, would be considered true threats because a reasonable 
person would find the comments they received to be serious expressions of 
intent to harm them.  Thus, these statements would not be entitled to First 
Amendment protections because these statements were not intended to 
further an exchange of ideas and could easily and reasonably be understood 
as actual intent to inflict harm. 
ii. The Subjective Test for True Threats 
Under a subjective test, however, “a true threat requires proof that the 
speaker or author intended the speech as a threat of bodily harm.”91  Under 
the subjective test, the threats Quinn92 and Hess93 received would not easily 
qualify as true threats, because the intent of the message writers is not 
obvious.  This test requires victims of harassment to show the intent of the 
 
projectiles where no exchange of views is involved.”).  Id. at 1212 (quoting Shackelford v. Shirley, 
948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation omitted). 
 84.  D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1211.   
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 1212. 
 87.  Id. at 1213. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Parkin, supra note 10. 
 90.  Hess, supra note 20. 
 91.  D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1213.  
 92.  Parkin, supra note 10. 
 93.  Hess, supra, note 20. 
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harasser in order to receive any protection from the harassing and threatening 
message.94  Proving intent of an anonymous commenter who could be almost 
anywhere is an almost insurmountable task for victims who may have limited 
access to the time and resources necessary to meeting the standards of the 
test.  Thus, the subjective test falls short of fully protecting Internet users 
from the reasonable fear that these messages incite.  However, in extreme 
cases like those of Hess and Quinn, the anonymous writers would likely find 
it difficult to argue convincingly that they understood their messages but did 
not intend the messages to convey threats of harm.  While the Court has 
articulated both tests, until one is formally adopted, it will continue to be 
difficult for victims of cyber-threats and harassment to identify their rights 
and legal options.  This in turn will allow harassers to threaten women 
without facing consequences for their actions. 
iii. Hybrid Application of the Tests 
In Watts v. United States, the Court applied a hybrid of the two tests 
after Watts was accused of threatening to assassinate the president in a 
political rally.95  The Court held that even though Watts did use language 
that on its face could be interpreted as a threat, the communication was akin 
to “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to 
the President” and not a true threat.96  In applying a blend of the subjective 
and objective tests, the Court used the context of the statement—a 
disgruntled student trying to avoid the draft and speaking to his peers97–in 
order to conclude that Watts failed both tests.98  First, the Court analyzed the 
location.99  The Court noted that Watts was speaking at a rally, a venue where 
the expectation was that all speakers would speak in an exaggerated, 
unrehearsed fashion.100  The Court held that a reasonable person was unlikely 
to interpret the statement as an expression of intent.101  Second, the Court 
used the context to infer that Watts was in fact speaking in “vituperative, 
abusive, and inexact” language and not as a precise expression of his 
“willfulness” or intent.102  The Court’s linguistic analysis could easily be 
applied to Internet communications as well, especially when they are 
concerned with cyber-threats or online harassment. 
 
 94.  D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1213.  
 95.  Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). 
 96.  Id. at 708. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 707. 
 100.  Id. at 708. 
 101.  Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 102.  Id.  
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In the case of cyber-threats, a court would likely adopt a similar 
approach to the one used in Watts because language used online is similar to 
language used at political rallies.  I purport that Internet speech is not 
generally expected to be grammatically correct.  Internet speech is also often 
more exaggerated and hyperbolic than in-person speech.  Additionally, just 
as Watts’ use of inexact language showed that he did not have an intent to 
harm the president, online speech is often disregarded as exaggeration.  
However, online threats that have clear and exact language or references to 
specific types of harm or location should not be disregarded.  These 
expressions constitute a threat under either standard.  Under an objective test, 
they are threats because that is how a reasonable person would interpret 
them.  Under a subjective test, they are threats because the intent of the 
speaker is to intimidate.  Moreover, these expressions do not promote an 
exchange of ideas that the First Amendment seeks to protect, and they do 
have clear indicia of intent to inflict harm, so they should be treated as true 
threats. 
Crucially, the analysis of threatening language has not yet been applied 
to social media.  In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court analyzed 
statements Elonis made on his Facebook page that seemed to threaten his ex-
wife and their son’s school.103  Elonis argued that his speech on Facebook 
was protected by the First Amendment and that any attempt to censor him 
was unconstitutional unless the government could show that he actually 
intended to threaten his ex-wife.104  The Court first noted that the government 
cannot censor all speech on a whim; only a true threat is not protected by the 
First Amendment.105  The Court narrowly defined “true threat,” saying that 
“[t]o qualify as a true threat, a communication must be a serious expression 
of an intention to commit unlawful physical violence, not merely ‘political 
hyperbole’; ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks’; or ‘vituperative, abusive, and inexact’ statements.”106  The Court 
reiterated that true threats are not protected by the First Amendment 
because they “have little if any social value”107 while also having the 
ability to “inflict great harm.”108 
After determining that Elonis’s speech was not necessarily protected by 
the First Amendment, the Court avoided the question of whether Elonis’s 
speech was protected under the First Amendment and instead remanded the 
case.109  The majority held that at trial, the Government had failed to establish 
 
 103.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 104.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009. 
 105.  Id. at 2019.  
 106.  Id. at 2019. 
 107.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 2013 
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Elonis’s mental state and had not adequately shown that Elonis was aware 
that what he was doing was wrong.110  However, this result does not mean 
that online harassment and threats could not be punished.  Rather, the detail 
that the Court used to quote and paraphrase Elonis’s speech indicates that the 
Court is troubled by cyber-threats and cyber-harassment111  The Court could 
have omitted these quotations from its opinion and simply dealt with the 
overbroad language in the code section; including the specific language 
Elonis used demonstrates a preoccupation with these threats and a desire to 
grapple with the language.  Further, the decision to remand the case instead 
of determining that the law is unconstitutional suggests that if the legislature 
specified that the required mental state for these harassing and violent 
messages was negligence, then victims would be likely to succeed when 
challenging this behavior in court. 
In his dissent, Justice Alito addressed the issue of the First Amendment 
and social media explicitly.  Justice Alito argued that statements on social 
media are not entitled to greater First Amendment protection than other 
statements and in fact may be more suspect.112  He explained that since these 
statements are directed at a named victim, the threats are “much more likely 
to be taken seriously.”113  He also noted that these threats should not be 
dismissed as mere hoaxes or parodies since this provides a get out of jail free 
card to “to anyone who is clever enough to dress up a real threat in the guise 
of rap lyrics, a parody, or something similar.”114  Alito’s dissent shows an 
interest in protecting victims of cyber-threats and cyber-harassment from 
threatening and abusive behavior, but also signals that the Legislature must 
take proactive steps to ensure that legislations adopted to support victims of 
cyber-harassment is clearly defined. 
Taken together, Virginia, D.C., and Elonis all suggest that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state from interfering in some speech 
and speech-acts, but not all.115  They suggest that the State may not prohibit 
speech in print and online if the purpose of the speech or publication is to 
share ideas, but it may prohibit speech or other communications that contain 
 
 110.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011. 
 111.  Id. at 2005-08 (quoting Elonis’s posts and threats).) 
 112.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016.  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (“certain types of content discrimination did 
not violate the First Amendment . . . Virginia’s statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment 
insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate”  Id. at 361, 362); D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. 
App. 4th 1190 (“[t]he first amendment permits ‘restrictions upon the content of speech . . . which 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’”  Id. at 1211.); Elonis v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (the federal government may regulate some speech online, but must 
provide a mental state requirement in the regulation).   
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true threats.116  The State may censor threats because the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments are intended to promote the free exchange of ideas rather than 
the ability of one speaker to bully, intimidate, or frighten another person.  
Much of the communication online may not rise to the level of a true threat.  
However, the speech that does is not protected, and it can be regulated if the 
federal government has a jurisdictional hook. 
B.  Congress May Regulate the Internet under the Commerce Clause 
While Congress may regulate threats by prohibiting them or even 
criminalizing them, in order to avoid overreach, Congress must also have the 
authority to regulate the medium of communication.  In other words, even if 
threats are not protected speech under the First Amendment, Congress 
cannot simply ban all threats.  In order for the federal government to regulate 
the threats made against women online, it must be able to regulate the 
Internet as a medium.  One hook for Congress to regulate the Internet is the 
Commerce Clause.  The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to 
regulate interstate commerce.  In United States. v. Lopez, the Court held that 
Congress may regulate three categories of activities under its Commerce 
Clause power: 
(1) “Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate 
commerce”; (2) “Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities”; and (3) “Congress’ commerce authority 
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”117 
Thus, under the Lopez doctrine, Congress may regulate the Internet if it is a 
channel of interstate commerce, an instrumentality of interstate commerce, 
or something that has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 
The limits of the Commerce Clause have been interpreted and expanded 
by multiple courts.  This judicially-approved expansion became particularly 
notable in the mid-twentieth century.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, for instance, the Heart of Atlanta Motel argued that Congress 
exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce when it passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, making it illegal for the motel to refuse to rent rooms to 
African Americans.118  The Supreme Court held that because the motel 
 
 116.  See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190; Elonis 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) 
 117.  United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). 
 118.  Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).  
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“serve[d] interstate travelers,”119 the business and business practices of the 
motel had an effect on interstate commerce, and Congress could regulate 
these business practices even though they were local and not interstate.120  
Heart of Atlanta Motel expanded the definition of what Congress could 
regulate under the Commerce Clause.  This case indicates that the courts 
may continue to expand their definition of what can be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause and suggests that the Court is more inclined to approve 
of expansion when there is a matter of public accommodations in 
question.  Like motels, the Internet is used to facilitate interstate 
commerce.  Where motels are used to allow individuals to move through 
states in support of commerce,121 the Internet today facilitates “the 
interstate flow of goods and people.”122 
Similarly, in United States v. Ballinger, Ballinger was charged with 
intentionally destroying religious property while traveling across state 
lines.123  Ballinger argued that Congress did not have the power to regulate 
his behavior as he travelled across state lines because destruction of private 
property does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.124  The 
Eleventh Circuit explained that channels of commerce are the “interstate 
transportation routes”125 that Ballinger had used, while “[i]nstrumentalities 
of interstate commerce . . . are the people and things themselves moving in 
commerce, including automobiles, airplanes, boats, and shipments of 
goods.”126  The court reasoned that Ballinger could be regulated because 
Congress may “regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce . . . 
to prohibit their use for harmful purposes,”127 even if the act is local.128  The 
court finally held that Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to 
“reach criminal conduct in which the illegal acts ultimately occur intrastate, 
when the perpetrator uses the channels or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce to facilitate their commission.”129  Again, Ballinger shows both 
that the definition of what can be regulated is shifting and can be expanded 
to accommodate changing methods of communication, as well as change 
social understandings of what is appropriate. 
 
 119.  Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. 379 U.S. at 261.  
 120.  Id. at 258.  
 121.  Id. at 257. 
 122.  Id. at 250.   
 123.  United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 124.  Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1224.  
 125.  Id. at 1225.  
 126.  Id. at 1226. 
 127.  Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
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The definition of instrumentalities of commerce was further expanded 
in United States v. Pipkins.130  There, the court held that Pipkins had engaged 
in interstate commerce by traveling across state lines to conduct business and 
had used instrumentalities of commerce, including “pagers, telephones, and 
mobile phones . . . [used] to communicate . . . while conducting business.”131  
Pipkins demonstrates that the federal government can regulate technology 
when the technology is used in interstate commerce.  Since the Internet is a 
technology that is used to conduct business across state lines, Pipkins 
suggests that the Internet could be regulated in the same way.132 
In United States v. Panfil,133 the Eleventh Circuit expanded the 
government’s ability to regulate technology where it categorized the Internet 
as “an instrument of interstate commerce.”134  This result clearly suggests 
that the federal government can regulate the Internet and online activities. 
The reach of the Commerce Clause has expanded drastically over time.  
Courts have historically looked most favorably on expansions of the 
Commerce Clause that promote a positive social change or benefit.  The 
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggests that the limits of what 
Congress can regulate has shifted over time in response to changing 
technologies and modified understandings of acceptable behavior.  In Brooks 
v. United States, the Court held that Congress can regulate interstate 
commerce to prohibit activities that “promote immorality, dishonesty, or the 
spread of any evil or harm.”135  In Ballinger, the court further noted that 
Congress could use its Commerce Clause power to ensure that 
instrumentalities of commerce are not used “for harmful purposes, even if 
the targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely 
local in nature.”136  Ultimately, these cases clearly show that 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce can, and should, be regulated to 
prevent harm and promote public policy. 
Further, several appellate courts have categorized the Internet as an 
instrumentality of commerce.  In United States v. Pipkins, “Pipkins used the 
Internet to promote his online escort service.”137  The Eleventh Circuit held 
that this Internet use was analogous to his use of other interpersonal 
 
 130.  United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 131.  Id. at 1294-95. 
 132.  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), in which the Court held 
that because the frequency of Internet use in conducting interstate commerce has increased, states 
may impose a sales tax on the sale of goods within its borders, even if the seller has no physical 
presence in the state.   
 133.  United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 134.  Panfil, 338 F.3d at 1300.  
 135.  Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925).   
 136.  United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005).  See also United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); Brooks, 267 U.S. at 436.   
 137.  United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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communication devices, including pagers, mobile phones, and telephones, 
because it allowed Pipkins to conduct business.138  Similarly, in Hillis v. 
Equifax Consumer Services, the court held that “[d]efendants used an 
instrumentality of commerce, namely, the Internet.”139  In both cases, the 
court held that since the defendants had used the Internet, they used an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, and their actions could be regulated 
by federal laws. 
III. Proposed Solution: Regulation 
As Joan Hoff argues, women have never achieved full equality with 
men in America.140  One reason is that women’s complaints and concerns are 
frequently dismissed as hysterical overreactions or as limited to women 
alone.141  Because these concerns are rarely taken seriously, little has been 
done by those in positions of power to protect women enough to create a 
space in which women are able to interact without fear of harassment.142  The 
problem is compounded by the fact that many legislators do not understand 
the power of the Internet or how social media and websites work.143  Despite 
these barriers, women have an active online presence and should not be left 
with the only resort of being offline to avoid cyber-threats or online 
harassment.144  Moreover, the active presence of a more diverse pool of 
Internet users is beneficial to other Internet users.145  As such, when women 
are pushed off the Internet by harassers, overall Internet communication 
drops severely.146  Ensuring that the Internet does not become a platform 
used to intimidate women is important not just to women who regularly put 
up with vitriol, but also to anyone who hopes to see increased use of and 
participation in online platforms.  Thus, the increase in Internet diversity that 
curbing cyber-harassment would create is in the interest of all Internet 
users.147  One way to make sure that all people continue to use the Internet 
freely and openly, in order to continue to push for a free trade of ideas and 
open commerce, is to make sure that unacceptable offline behavior and 
language is also taken seriously and prohibited online. 
 
 138.  United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).  
 139.  Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 511 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 140.  HOFF, supra note 7 at 1, 3. 
 141.  HOFF, supra note 7 at 12. 
 142.  Id. at 5. 
 143.  See, e.g., Senator Asks How Facebook Remains Free, Mark Zuckerberg Smirks: ‘We Run 
Ads’, YOUTUBE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2H8wx1aBiQ. 
 144.  Hess, supra note 20.  
 145.  Women’s Media Center, supra Note 1 (access to the Internet results in increased research 
for medical information, and increased incidence of friendship connection).   
 146.  Hess, supra note 20.  
 147.  Women’s Media Center, supra note 1.   
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As an instrumentality of interstate commerce,148 the Internet can be 
regulated.  The holdings in Pipkins and Equifax show that individuals who 
use the Internet may be regulated by federal laws when their use is for 
business purposes, and that criminal activity online can be punished under 
such laws.  Further, Ballinger and Heart of Atlanta Motel suggest that 
nonbusiness activities of an entity using an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce are also regulatable.  Finally, Elonis, Black, and D.C. v. R.R. 
demonstrate that not all speech is protected by the First Amendment freedom 
of speech.  These cases suggest that online speech that is not subject to First 
Amendment protection can be regulated by the federal government because 
the speaker is using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 
However, not all speech that is perceived as threatening may be 
regulated.  As Elonis and D.C. indicate, only true threats are not protected 
by the First Amendment,149 so only true threats can be regulated.  
Additionally, as Elonis demonstrates, any regulation should include the 
requisite mental state.150  Even if the required mental state were recklessness, 
operating under a subjective test151 would be an improvement over the 
current unregulated status of the Internet.  Creating regulations that prohibit 
or criminalize the act of sending these offensive messages would keep the 
worst offenders offline by allowing law enforcement officers to work across 
jurisdictions to investigate.  Additionally, this strategy might create, in the 
public imagination, the idea that some things should not be said in jest.  
Better still, Congress should adopt an objective standard by requiring only a 
negligent mental state.  This would permit women who reasonably feel 
threatened or intimidated by comments made online to contact law 
enforcement officers and be taken seriously, instead of having their concerns 
dismissed.  Moreover, law enforcement officers would be able to prosecute 
offenders regardless of where the victim and the harasser live.152  This policy 
could also help to protect victims of domestic abuse, who suffer online and 
offline.153  Finally, this type of legislation would ensure that all Internet users 
are able to interact with each other, promoting the flow of ideas and capital. 
 
 148.  See United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 149.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190 
(2010). 
 150.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.  
 151.  In D.C., 182 Cal. App. 4th at 1190, the court explained that an objective test asks whether 
a reasonable recipient could perceive a message as a threat; a subjective test looks at the intent of 
the speaker.   
 152.  Hess, supra note 18.  
 153.  Chemaly, supra note 25.  
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Conclusion 
The Internet is a global network that promotes the exchange of ideas 
and goods.  It has also become a frightening place to communicate because 
of the lack of regulation surrounding how people conduct themselves online.  
The lack of regulation has impacted women in particular, who are subjected 
to an overwhelming volume of harassing and threatening messages.  
However, as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the Internet can be 
regulated by the federal government.  Moreover, many of these messages are 
likely not protected by the speaker’s First Amendment freedom of speech 
because they are true threats.  The government can regulate against such 
speech in order to promote public policy, thus keeping with the long tradition 
of expanding the Commerce Clause in order to ensure that our laws reflect 
our society’s more nuanced views of what is, and is not, appropriate.  
Regulating these speech acts online is not a great step forward in terms of 
accepted legislative power, but it would promote a much safer and more 
welcoming cyberspace. 
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